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Abstract 
Using Bayesian methods, we estimate a small open economy model in which consumers 
face limits to credit determined by the value of their housing stock. The purpose of this 
paper is to quantify the role of collateralized household debt in the Canadian business 
cycle. Our findings show that the presence of borrowing constraints improves the 
performance of the model in terms of overall goodness of fit. In particular, the presence 
of housing collateral generates a positive correlation between consumption and house 
prices. Finally we find that housing collateral induced spillovers account for a large share 
of consumption growth during the housing market boom-bust cycle of the late 1980s. 
JEL classification: E21, E32, E44, E52, R21  
Bank classification: Business fluctuations and cycles; Credit and credit aggregates; 
Transmission of monetary policy  
Résumé 
À l’aide de techniques bayésiennes, les auteurs estiment le modèle d’une petite économie 
ouverte au sein de laquelle le pouvoir d’emprunt des consommateurs est limité par la 
valeur de leur patrimoine immobilier. L’étude vise à quantifier le rôle joué par les 
emprunts des ménages adossés à des actifs réels dans le cycle économique au Canada. 
D’après les résultats obtenus, l’introduction de contraintes de crédit améliore 
l’adéquation générale du modèle. En particulier, la présence de garanties immobilières 
permet d’établir une corrélation positive entre la consommation et le prix des maisons. 
Les auteurs constatent en dernier lieu que les effets induits par ce type de garantie 
expliquent dans une large mesure la croissance de la consommation pendant le cycle 
d’envolée et d’effondrement des prix du logement à la fin des années 1980. 
Classification JEL : E21, E32, E44, E52, R21  
Classification de la Banque : Cycles et fluctuations économiques; Crédit et agrégats du 
crédit; Transmission de la politique monétaire  
 
 1. Introduction
Consumption expenditures and house prices comove over the business cycle. This positive
correlation can be found in macroeconomic time-series estimates for a variety of countries
(Case et al. (2005)) including Canada (Pichette and Tremblay (2003)). As the recent ex-
perience in many OECD countries has shown, house prices can ￿ uctuate considerably over
time, making it important to understand how changing house prices in￿ uence consumption
behaviour.
The goal of this paper is to investigate the importance of the link between rising house
prices and higher consumption expenditures that operates through improvements in house-
hold debt capacity. To this end, we construct a New Keynesian model in which a fraction of
households borrow against the value of their houses. We estimate the model with Canadian
data using Bayesian methods. We then assess the importance of the model￿ s collateral e⁄ect
in its ability to capture key features of consumption and house price data.
From an aggregate perspective there are a number of reasons to think that house prices
could in￿ uence consumption decisions in Canada. First, residential structures and land
account for a large share of Canadian household sector wealth. Sixty eight per cent of
Canadian households own a home and for many it represents their largest asset. Second,
house price growth is associated with higher household borrowing. The positive correlation
between consumption and house prices may be related to housing￿ s role as collateral. Between
2000 and 2007 the real price of existing homes increased by 52 per cent. At the same time,
the ratio of household debt to GDP rose dramatically from 58 per cent in 2000 to 76 percent
in 2007. By 2007 roughly 80 per cent of Canadian household debt was secured by real estate.
Our paper is related to the business cycle literature on the role of collateral constraints
in the transmission of shocks. A key feature of these models is that collateral e⁄ects are
a propagation mechanism rather than a driving force of macro ￿ uctuations on their own.
Using U.S. time series data, Iacoviello (2005) estimates a New Keynesian DSGE model in
which borrowers face collateral constraints tied to their house value. He ￿nds that collateral
e⁄ects allow the model to reproduce the positive response of spending to a house price shock
generated by a Vector Autoregressive model.
Our model shares many features with Iacoviello (2005). At the core of the model is the
borrowers-lenders setup developed by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). There are two types of
households di⁄erentiated by the degree to which they discount the future. In equilibrium
1one type of household is a lender and the other type a borrower. Borrowers face a collateral
constraint that limits their ability to borrow to a fraction of the value of their housing assets.
Rising house values can therefore improve the debt capacity of borrowers, allowing them to
increase consumption. Households buy and sell housing in a centralized market.
Since our goal is to quantify the links between consumption and house prices in Canada,
we estimate the model with Canadian data using Bayesian methods. To this end we extend
the model of Iacoviello (2005) along two important dimensions. First, we introduce open-
economy features into this closed economy framework. This extension allows for foreign savers
to supply funds to the domestic economy, which a⁄ects the response of interest rates and
house prices to shocks.1 Second, we relax the assumption of a ￿xed housing stock, allowing
for investment in structures. Allowing the supply of housing to ￿ uctuate a⁄ects the price of
housing and, potentially, the role of collateralized debt in business cycle ￿ uctuations.
We ￿nd statistical evidence that suggests collateral links between the housing market and
the rest of the economy are important. We estimate two versions of the model, one nested in
the other. In the benchmark model, housing collateral values can have an impact on aggregate
consumption and in the alternative speci￿cation this channel is not allowed to operate. We
￿nd statistical evidence that the model with collateral e⁄ects outperforms the model without
in 1-step ahead prediction. In addition, our estimates of the fraction of households facing
collateral constraints are plausible when compared to a range of international evidence.
Our results also highlight that there are important di⁄erences across models in the re-
sponse of consumption to a number of shocks. In particular, housing collateral generates
a positive response of consumption to a housing demand shock, a feature that is necessary
for our empirical model to capture the observed correlation between consumption and house
prices. Despite their importance for consumption, we ￿nd the e⁄ects of housing market
shocks on aggregate GDP are relatively small, similar to estimates for the U.S. 2
Finally, the model suggests that housing collateral-induced spillovers accounted for a large
share of consumption growth during the housing boom of the late 1980s and the sharp declines
in consumption growth in the early 1990s. While collateral e⁄ects boosted consumption
growth in the early part of the post-2000 housing boom, these e⁄ects were less important for
the continued rise in consumption and house prices from 2005-2007. External developments
1Aizenman and Jinjarak (2008) emphasize the links between open economy considerations and housing
markets. They ￿nd evidence for a strong positive relationship between current account de￿cits and appreci-
ation of real estate prices in cross-country panel data.
2See for instance (Jarocinski and Smets (2008)) for the US and (IMF (2008)) for Canada.
2re￿ ected in the high real exchange rate played an important role in this latter period.
Our work is closely related to Iacoviello and Neri (2009), who also adapt the model of
Iacoviello (2005) to include residential investment. Their objective is to quantify the spillovers
of the housing market in the U.S. business cycle. The main di⁄erence between Iacoviello and
Neri (2009) and our model is the open economy considerations. This paper is also related to
micro data studies of the links between consumption and house prices. Campbell and Cocco
(2007) ￿nd that consumption expenditures and house prices are more strongly related among
household groupings that are likely to face ￿nancial constraints. Attanasio et al. (2005) argue
that the comovement of consumption and house prices represents their responses to some
other common factor, such as a productivity shock. In our general equilibrium framework
there are a variety of aggregate disturbances, including shocks related to productivity, that
can drive both consumption and house prices.
We present the details of the model in section 2. Section 3 outlines the estimation strategy
and the data. Section 4 describes the empirical results. In Section 5 we conclude and highlight
future work
2. Model
As in Iacoviello (2005), we consider a sticky-price economy populated by two types of house-
holds. Credit ￿ ows are generated by assuming ex-ante heterogeneity in agents￿subjective
discount factors. Impatient consumers di⁄er from patient consumers in that they discount
the future at a faster rate. Hence, in equilibrium, patient agents are net lenders while impa-
tient agents are net borrowers. To prevent borrowing from growing without limit, we assume
that borrowers face credit constraints tied to the expected future value of collateral. We also
assume perfectly competitive intermediate-good-producing ￿rms, retailers that operate in a
monopolistically competitive market, and a monetary authority.
2.1 Households
Households supply labour and derive utility from consumption, housing services, and real
















3where households can be one of two types, denoted i = 1;2, that are distinguished by their
time-discount rates ￿1 and ￿2. bCi;t￿1 represent external habits in consumption. ￿b;t repre-
sents a shock to the discount rate that a⁄ects the intertemporal substitution of households,
ji;t is a shock to the preference for housing services and ￿L;tis a shock to labour supply. We
will refer to ji;t as a housing demand shock.
Lenders. Patient households (denoted by 1), have a higher propensity to save, i.e.
￿1 > ￿2: So, in equilibrium, they supply loans to impatient households, b1;t; and accumulate
properties for housing purposes, h1;t. Patient households also buy foreign bonds, b￿
t. The
return on foreign debt depends on a country speci￿c risk premium &: Lenders also receive
dividends, Ft, from the ￿nal-good-producing ￿rms. They maximize their expected utility
subject to the budget constraint,



















where ￿t = Pt=Pt￿1 is the gross in￿ ation rate, qh;t is the price of housing, qk;t is the price of
capital, w1;t real wages of type-1 households, and st the real exchange rate. All the variables,
except for the gross nominal interest rates on domestic and foreign bonds,Rt; and R￿
t, are
expressed in real terms. We assume that the housing stock is variable. Thus, di⁄erently from
Iacoviello (2005), households accumulate properties that depreciate at a rate ￿h: Lenders￿









Uc1;tqk;t ￿ ￿1EtUc1;t+1qk;t+1(1 ￿ ￿k) = ￿1EtUc1;t+1Rk;t+1 (4)












Unlike Iacoviello (2005) we augment our model with a demand function for foreign loanable
funds (6). The introduction of the risk-premium, &t, is required for the model to feature a
stationary distribution.3 Following Adolfson et al. (2007) we assume that the risk premium
3See, e.g., Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003) for further details.



















The inclusion of the expected exchange rate in the risk premium is motivated by empirical
￿ndings of a strong negative correlation between the risk premium and the expected depreci-
ation, as reported by Fama (1984) and Duarte and Stockman (2005). The demand for foreign
funds combined with the demand function for domestic loanable funds, implies an uncovered
interest parity condition, which in log-linearized form obeys
^ rt ￿ ^ r
￿
t = (1 + ￿s)Et￿st+1 + ￿s￿st + ￿
where rt = Rt ￿ Et￿t+1.
Borrowers. Impatient households (denoted by 2) maximize their stream of expected
future utility subject to a budget constraint












Following Iacoviello (2005) we assume that borrowing is limited to a fraction of the value of
borrowers housing stock; where, (1￿m) represents the cost that lenders have to pay in order
to repossess the asset in case of default. We also assume that impatient households do not
have access to the foreign bond market. Labour supply and borrowing demand are given by




where ￿t is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the borrowing constraint.4 For the bor-
rowers, the marginal bene￿t of holding one extra unit of housing also takes into account the






= Uc2;tqh;t + ￿2EtUc2;t+1qh;t+1(1 ￿ ￿h) . (10)
4Impatient households borrow up to the maximum in the neighborhood of the deterministic steady state.








5Finally, as in Erceg et al. (2000) each household is a monopoly supplier of di⁄erentiated
labour services which allows them to set their own wage. Wage setting is subject to a Calvo
style rigidity with each household facing a probability ￿w that it will not be able to reset its
wage in given period. Those households who do not reoptimize their wage, wi;t; index to the
steady state rate of in￿ ation. Note that the wages for each household type are determined
separately, but we assume that both household types face the same degree of wage stickiness.































Overall labour supply of type i, Li;t, is a composite of the individual labour supplies


































As all households of each type are the same, the wage aggregator implies a process for
the nominal wage Wi;t
Wi;t = (￿w(Wi;t￿1)





Domestic producers make the intermediate input, Y d;int; using rented capital, k, and labour
supplied by patient agents, L1, and impatient agents, L2. The hours worked of the two
households enter into the production function in a Cobb-Douglas form implying that the two
labour types are complements.5 Under this formulation the parameter ￿ is a measure of the
labour income share of the unconstrained households. Intermediate goods are produced in a













where zt is an aggregate productivity shock. Intermediate domestic goods are sold at the
competitive price mcd
t, i.e. at domestic marginal cost.








Pt is the markup of ￿nal over wholesale goods. First order conditions for the
￿rms are standard and available in Appendix A.
2.2.1 Wholesaler￿ s Problem
Domestic brands The producers of domestic brands buy the domestic intermediate input,
Y d;int; from entrepreneurs, at price mcd, and transform it using a linear technology into
Y d
t (zd). Each ￿rm faces a Calvo price rigidity, with a non-zero probability, ￿d; of being
unable to adjust its nominal price in a given period. Firms maximize the expected present




































5As in Iacoviello and Neri (2009), the primary motivation for this is to allow us to obtain a closed-form
solution fo rthe steady-state of the model.
7where the price elasticity ￿p is subject to a shock. We interpret this as a cost-push or





















This implies that the price of the domestic intermediate good, P d































Imported brands Finally, there is a continuum of intermediate-good-importing ￿rms zm 2
[0;1]. They import a homogeneous intermediate foreign good at price P ￿
t to produce a
di⁄erentiated good Y m
t (zm). Importers face a Calvo price rigidity, with each ￿rm facing a
non-zero probability, ￿m; of being unable to adjust its nominal price in a given period. Firms



































Imported intermediate goods are imperfect substitutes in the production of the composite





















Thus, the price of the intermediate imported good, P m
t ; is a composite of the individual



































2.2.2 Retailer￿ s Problem
Retailers combine domestic brands of intermediate goods Y d; and imported intermediate
goods Y m; to form a ￿nal good Y . Retailers operate in a perfectly competitive market using




















where ! > 0 is the share of imported goods in the ￿nal domestic goods basket and ￿ > 0
is the elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported intermediate goods. Cost
minimization entails the following demand curves for Y d and Y m
Y
d















Yt + ￿m;t , (30)
and a domestic aggregate price level P corresponding to the CPI, such that









2.3 Housing producer￿ s problem
Housing producers are competitive ￿rms that use ￿nal goods and rented housing to produce
new units of installed housing capital Ah;tIh;t that they sell for price qh
t . Thus they choose


















We assume a quadratic cost of adjusting the housing stock as in Aoki et al. (2004) where  h
governs the slope of the housing adjustment cost function. In addition, we include Ah;t, i.e.
an AR(1) shock to the equilibrium condition of housing investment. Since this is a shock to
the marginal e¢ ciency of producing housing, we interpret it as a housing-speci￿c technology















This equation is similar to the Tobin￿ s q relationship for investment, in which the marginal
cost of a unit of housing is related the marginal cost of adjusting the housing stock. Note that
a positive shock to the housing speci￿c technology will reduce the price of installed housing.
2.4 Capital producer￿ s problem
Capital producers take ￿nal goods and transform them into capital in a way that is analogous
to the housing producers, only they face adjustment costs related to the change in investment
as in Christiano et al. (2005).  k governs the slope of the capital producers adjustment cost








































































where Ak;t is an AR(1) shock that we interpret as a capital-investment-speci￿c shock as in
Greenwood et al. (1998) and Fisher (2006).
102.5 Monetary policy
For simplicity we assume that the central bank uses the Taylor-type interest rate rule:
^ Rt = ￿R ^ Rt￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿R)￿￿(^ ￿t ￿ ^ ￿
￿
t) + (1 ￿ ￿R)￿Y \ GDP + ￿MP;t:
The monetary authority adjusts the nominal interest rate in response to deviations of
in￿ ation from its target, and deviations of GDP from its steady state value. We also allow
for interest-rate smoothing behaviour. The central bank￿ s target, ^ ￿
￿
t; is assumed to be time
varying and is subject to an AR(1) shock as in Smets and Wouters (2003) and Adolfson et al.
(2007). ￿MP;t is an i.i.d. monetary policy shock.
2.6 Market clearing conditions
Domestic output Yt, can be consumed, invested or exported







and real GDP is GDPt = c1;t + c2;t + qk;tIk
t + qh;tIh
t + Y x
t ￿ stY m
t .6
Capital is accumulated according to
Ih;t = Ht ￿ (1 ￿ ￿h)Ht￿1 (36)
where the aggregate stock of housing is Ht=h1;t + h2;t; and the usual capital accumulation
equation holds
Ik;t = kt ￿ (1 ￿ ￿k)kt￿1: (37)
The domestic loan market condition implies that total borrowed funds are equal to funds
lent out by patient households
b2;t = ￿b1;t (38)























6As in Iacoviello and Neri (2009) and Davis and Heathcote (2005) we set the relative prices qh;qk;s equal
to their steady state values.
112.7 Rest of the World
We assume Canada to be a small open economy. Thus, domestic developments do not a⁄ect
the rest of the world economy. By analogy with the import demand function of the local
economy, the demand for the domestic economy￿ s exports is captured by
^ Y
x
t = ^ Y
g
t ￿ ￿ ^ P
x
t + ￿ex;t







is the real price of local brands in the global economy and ￿ex;t is an export









t ￿ ￿fE^ ￿
x
t+1 =
(1 ￿ ￿x)(1 ￿ ￿￿x)
￿x
(￿^ st ￿ ^ P
x
t ); (40)
where ￿x is the probability that the price of a local brand will remain sticky in the global
economy in a given period.
2.7.1 Shock processes
Apart from ￿MP;t; a zero-mean i.i.d. shock with variance ￿MP;the other structural shocks in
the model, ￿t = f￿b;t;jt;￿s;t;zt;Ah;t;Ak;t;￿IO;t;￿L;t;￿ex;t;￿m;t;￿p;tg; follow an AR(1) process
ln(￿t) = ￿￿ ln(￿t￿1) + "￿t; "￿t v
iid N(0;￿"￿); 0 < ￿￿ < 1 . (41)
3. Data and model estimation strategy
The vector of structural parameters of the model, ￿, describing preferences, technology, the
monetary policy rule and the shocks is estimated using Bayesian techniques. First, for given
parameter values we solve the model using standard ￿rst-order approximation techniques
(see, for example Uhlig, 1999). Then, we use the Kalman ￿lter to compute the likelihood
L(￿t j￿) for the given sample of data ￿t ; as in Hamilton (1994). We use some informative
priors, ’(￿), in order to downweight regions of the parameter space that are widely accepted
to be uninteresting. Using Bayes￿ s rule, the posterior distribution can be written as the
product of the likelihood function of the data given the parameters, L(￿t j￿), and the prior,
’(￿):
12P(￿j￿t) n L(￿t j￿)’(￿) (42)
We start by estimating the posterior distribution￿ s mode by maximizing the log posterior
function. Second, we obtain a random draw of size 300 000 from the posterior distribution
using the random-walk Metropolis-Hastings algorithm. The posterior distribution of the
parameters can be used to draw statistical inference on the parameters themselves or functions
of the parameters, such as second moments.
3.1 The Data
We estimate the model using Canadian data for consumption, capital investment, residential
investment, exports, imports, hours worked, real wages, real house prices, short and long-
term nominal interest rates, the real bilateral exchange rate (with the United States) and
the in￿ ation rate. The availability of the house price data and a desire to have a sample over
which the conduct of monetary policy and the statistical properties of in￿ ation have been
relatively stable restrict us to considering data from 1981Q1 to 2007Q4.
All of our expenditures data is from the Canadian Income and Expenditure Accounts
published by Statistics Canada. Consumption is measured by real personal expenditure
on consumer goods and services, while residential investment is real residential structures
investment. For capital investment we use real business ￿xed investment (equipment and
structures). The data for exports and imports include both goods and services trade.
Data on actual hours worked are taken from the Labour Force Survey and wage data
include wages, salaries and supplementary labour income taken from the Income and Expen-
diture Accounts.
Our measure of real house prices is the Multiple Listing Service existing house sales price.
This index measures the average sale price of all existing residential dwellings sold in a given
period.7 We calculate the real house price by de￿ ating this house price series using the CPI
measure described below.
The overnight rate, the interest rate at which major ￿nancial institutions borrow and
lend one-day (or "overnight") funds among themselves, is our measure of the short-term
7This series is highly correlated with an alternative index of resale housing prices from Royal Lepage that
measures the prices of houses with similar characteristics in di⁄erent regions across the country. For this
reason we do not think that composition bias is important enough to a⁄ect our results.
13nominal interest rate. We subtract the 10-year Government of Canada bond rate from this
short-term rate to obtain a measure of the yield spread. We chose to use this term spread
series rather than the overnight rate on its own because the latter implies that real interest
rates have been trending down over our sample.8 This implies that stance of monetary policy
was restrictive throughout the 1980s and easy after the early 1990s, which is at odds with
the historical interpretation of events reported in Armour et al. (1996). In contrast the term
spread appears to be more consistent with the historical record and also similar to other
measures of the stance of Canadian monetary policy described in Fung and Yuan (1999).
We use the Bank of Canada￿ s measure of "core" CPI in￿ ation. This measure of in￿ ation
in consumer prices excludes the e⁄ects of price changes from eight of the most volatile com-
ponents of the CPI (e.g. mortgage interest costs, vegetables and gasoline) and changes in
indirect taxes.9The in￿ ation rate is expressed as a quarterly rate. We subtract 0.5 per cent
(the Bank of Canada￿ s in￿ ation target expressed in quarterly rates) from this series before
estimation. Though this is not the full-sample mean, it has the advantage that the treatment
of the data is consistent with in￿ ation being at the Bank of Canada￿ s target in the steady
state. In practice, the in￿ ation objective shock will then account for the transition from the
higher in￿ ation of the 1980s to the period in which the Bank of Canada formally adopted
in￿ ation targeting.
Finally, the real exchange rate is calculated as the product of the nominal exchange rate
(price of a U.S. dollars in terms of Canadian dollars) and U.S. CPI (excluding food and
energy) divided by Canadian "core" CPI.
The borrowing constraint in the model has implications for the dynamics of the compo-
nents of GDP making these series important for identifying the share of constrained house-
holds. In addition, using separate series for consumption, capital investment and housing
investment gives us the best chance of estimating the adjustment costs parameters for the
two types of investment.
All of our series are taken at a quarterly frequency. The real series are logged and
detrended separately using a linear trend. The model also implies that the value of the
housing stock, qtht , is a constant proportion of consumption. The di⁄erent trends in the raw
8DeGraeve et al. (2007) is another example of a medium-scale DSGE model estimated with yield curve
data (for the United States).
9Unlike the U.S. consumer price index, the Canadian CPI data do not include the cost of imputed rents.
Nonetheless, house prices do a⁄ect our measure of in￿ ation through owned accommodation prices, which
include such costs as home insurance, house depreciation and property taxes.
14consumption and housing investment data imply that the real price of housing should also
have an upward trend if it is to obey the balanced growth restriction of the model. However,
the trend in our real house price series is higher than is implied by this relationship. Since
this may re￿ ect some other structural change that is not well captured by the model, for
example ￿nancial innovation, we also remove a linear trend from the house price data.
A detailed description of the data sources and plots of the detrended data are presented
in Figure C1 and the Data Appendix.
3.2 Calibrated Parameters
We calibrate a number of parameters based on sample means or other information because
they would be di¢ cult to identify. The calibrated parameters include: the discount factors
￿1;￿2, the weight on housing in the utility function j, factor share ￿, depreciation rates ￿h;￿k,
the steady-state gross markups for all price-setting ￿rms, and the household loan-to-value
ratio mh.
We set the housing preference parameter j to match the ratio of personal sector residential
housing (land plus structures in the National Balance Sheet Accounts) to quarterly GDP,
which for our sample period averages about 6.910. We follow Iacoviello (2005) who draws
from micro-studies of the range of discount factors of consumers, in setting the discount
factor of patient agents ￿1 to 0.99 and the discount factor of impatient agents ￿2 to 0.9511.
The patient agent￿ s discount factor implies a steady-state real interest rate of 4 per cent on
an annual basis.
We set the elasticity of demand for individual domestic intermediate goods ￿ so as to give
an average markup of ￿ve percent in steady-state. Individual imported intermediate goods
have the same elasticity of demand. The share of imported goods in the ￿nal domestic goods
basket, !, is set to 0.3.
As a typical house has a much longer lifetime than a typical piece of equipment, the
housing depreciation rate, ￿H; should be lower than ￿k. The value of ￿H compatible with
10To calculate these ratios we measure Gross Domestic Product as the sum of the consumption, residential
investment, business ￿xed investment (i.e. excluding inventory accumulation) and net exports. Since the
real National Accounts aggregates are produced on a Chain Fisher basis we calculate these ratios using the
nominal series.
11This value is in accordance with estimates of discount factors for poor or young households (see Samwick
(1998) and Lawrence (1991)) and falls into the empirical distribution for discount factors estimated by Carroll
and Samwick (1997).
15the housing investment to GDP ratio was 0.01, implying an annual depreciation rate that
is somewhat higher than the range of values reported in Kostenbauer (2001). However, this
value is much lower than the depreciation rate for capital which is set to ￿k = 0.023, im-
plying and annual depreciation of the capital stock of 9.5 per cent. We treat non-residential
construction as part of business ￿xed investment, but exclude residential construction. Con-
sistent with this classi￿cation, the capital share in the production of ￿nal goods, ￿ =0.23, is
lower than is typically used in models that aggregate all types of capital. The depreciation
rate for capital along with the capital share in production of ￿nal goods, ￿ =0.23, imply a
ratio of business ￿xed investment to GDP of about 0.165, approximately that seen in the
data.
We also need to set a value for the loan-to-value ratio mh. This value should re￿ ect the
typical loan-to-value ratio for a constrained household. This household, who we think of
as being a ￿rst-time home buyer, borrows the maximum possible against their real estate
holdings12. Over most of our sample, Canadian law required mortgages in excess of 75 per
cent of the value of the property to be insured. In practice, home buyers were able to obtain
loans at considerably higher loan-to-value ratios with insurance. The minimum downpayment
required by insurers has varied over our sample, dropping from 10 per cent to 5 per cent in
1992 and to 0 per cent in 2004. It has returned to 5 per cent more recently. Thus, on average
over our sample, loan-to-value ratios for constrained households are likely to have fallen in
the 0.75 to 0.95 range. With no direct estimates for Canada, we set mh = 0:80, slightly lower
than the value chosen by Iacoviello and Neri (2008) based on U.S. data on new-home buyers.
3.3 Prior distributions of the estimated parameters
Table 1 summarizes the assumptions for the prior distributions of the estimated parameters.
We set the prior mean on the income share of unconstrained households to 0.65, with a
standard error of 0.075. This is within the range of estimates of the fraction of households
who are ￿nancially constrained reported in the literature. Campbell and Mankiw (1991)
estimate the fraction of constrained agents from Canadian macro data to be near 50 per
cent. Estimates based on micro data for the U.S. (Jappelli (1990)) and the U.K. (Benito and
12Ultimately we would like to incorporate information from observed ￿nancial variables such as mortgage
debt into the model. However, aggregate measures of mortgage debt in Canada include debt held by un-
constrained households who have had time to accumulate other assets and are better thought of as patient
consumers. It is not possible to capture this in the model since lenders own housing, but do not have mort-
gages. This forces the impatient households to hold all of the observed stock of debt if we are to match the
household debt-to-asset ratio in the data. In future, we may be able to exploit information from microdata
to determine a more appropriate target debt-to-asset ratio.
16Mumtaz (2006)) put the share of the population that is liquidity constrained between 20 and
40 per cent. We set the prior mean of the habit parameter in consumption b to 0.7 with a
standard error of 0.05. The prior mean for the labour supply elasticity is set to 2.0.
The prior means for the monetary policy rule are similar to those used in Smets and
Wouters (2007) and the standard errors are relatively large allowing the priors to be consistent
with the estimates for Canada by Lam and Tkacz (2004) and also the Canadian policy rules
discussed in Cote et al. (2004). We use a beta distributed prior on the inverse of the coe¢ cient
on in￿ ation (￿￿1
￿ ):Ultimately this results in a prior that is less informative than the normal
distribution that is more widely used. The prior mean on the smoothing parameter ￿r is set
to 0.5 and the prior mean for ￿y is 0:125.
For the ￿xed capital and housing capital adjustment costs we chose a gamma-distribution
with mean of about 1 and a standard error of 0.5 in both cases. We set a prior mean for the
probability that a retailer will be unable to adjust prices, ￿, to 0.5 implying that retail prices
are ￿xed for 2 quarters on average. This is in line with the evidence on the price-setting
behaviour of Canadian ￿rms reported in Amirault et al. (2006). The median ￿rm in their
survey sample adjusted prices 2 to 4 times a year. We use the same prior distributions for
the frequency of price adjustment by importers and export retailers in the foreign economy.
We also centre the prior mean for the frequency of wage adjustment at 0.5. Similar priors for
wage and price stickiness appear in Smets and Wouters (2007) and Adolfson et al. (2007).
The prior mean for the elasticity of the country risk premium with respect to the ratio
of foreign debt-to-output, ￿ = 0:001, is lower than found in previous work on estimation
of small-open economy models by Adolfson et al. (2007), Christo⁄el et al. (2007), and Dib
(2003).
We use inverse gamma priors on all the structural parameters governing the standard
deviations of the shocks. For the persistence parameters of the shock processes, we choose a
beta-distribution with a prior mean of 0.5 and standard deviation of 0.25. At our prior means
the model is able to match a set of key steady-state ratios observed in our data sample.
174. Empirical results
We estimate the model presented above and a representative agent version of the model in
which there are no borrowing constraints.13 We refer to our model as the FA model since it
has an active ￿nancial accelerator and the model without the borrowing constraints as the
NoFA model. Our objective is to document the role that the collateral constraints play in
the ability of the model to capture the moments of interest in the data. Initially, we report
mainly on the ￿t of the model over the entire sample. However, later we also consider the
whether the ￿nancial accelerator helps the model to account for episodes in history such as
housing booms/busts or a severe recession.
4.1 Posterior Distributions
We report the posterior mean and 95 per cent probability interval for the structural para-
meters, along with their priors, for the model with the borrowing constraint (FA model, in
Table 1) and the model without the borrowing constraint (NOFA model, in Table 2). Except
where noted, most of the parameters are within the ranges speci￿ed in the priors.
The habit persistence parameter, b is estimated to be 0.79, while the long-run elasticity
of labour demand ￿ is 0.55; the estimated habits are on the high end of our prior, and the
labour elasticity on the lower end.
The estimated range of ￿￿1
￿ implies a range for the in￿ ation weight in the monetary policy
rule, ￿￿, from 1.4 to 2.1, while the weight on output, ￿y; is fairly small (between 0.01 and
0.06). The interest rate smoothing term, ￿R; is between 0.41 and 0.68. The estimated policy
rule coe¢ cients are similar to those reported in other studies (Ortega and Rebei (2006), Dib
(2008), and Dib et al. (2008)).
The mean estimate of Calvo price stickiness for domestic goods ￿
d implies an average
duration of price stickiness of about six quarters. Such estimates for average price stickiness
are high relative to ￿ndings on price adjustment from micro studies, but they are in line with
previous DSGE models￿estimates ￿even with more elaborate systems of nominal stickiness
(for example Adolfson et al. (2007) and Smets and Wouters (2003)). Wage stickiness on the
other hand is much lower than in many other studies, with a typical wage being unchanged
for only four months on average.
13In this model the household still derives utility from housing services, but it also purchases capital and
rents it to the intermediate goods producer. The other households are no longer present in the model so that
there are no borrowers or lenders. All other features of the model are preserved.
18The price stickiness for imports ￿
m is about the same as for domestically produced goods.
However, price stickiness for exports ￿
x is much lower, the average export price being sticky
for only about 1.25 quarters on average. The long run elasticity of import demand ￿ is much
lower (about 0.3) than that of export demand ￿f (about 1.5). Such estimates re￿ ect a much
faster response of exports than imports to a change in the real exchange rate. This may re￿ ect
the composition of exports and imports. For example, Canada exports proportionately more
commodities that have relatively elastic demand, while importing more ￿nished goods for
which the demand is relatively inelastic.
The estimate of the wage share of unconstrained households, ￿, is about 0.62, implying
a share of labour income to credit constrained agents of about 38 percent, on the high end
of the range of empirical estimates in the literature.
4.1.1 FA versus NoFA
As measured by the Bayes factor (an estimate of the ratio of the marginal likelihoods of the
two models), FA outperforms NoFA in overall goodness of ￿t: the di⁄erence of the log Bayes
factors is 3540:07 ￿ 3520:57 = 19:50, implying a posterior odds ratio of about 2:94 ￿ 107 : 1
in favour of FA.
The biggest di⁄erences in the parameter estimates between FA and NoFA are related to
preferences. The NoFA estimates of habits are lower than the FA estimates, and the NoFA
estimate of labour supply elasticity is higher than FA￿ s. In addition, the estimated volatility
and persistence of the discount factor shock are higher in the NoFA model.
As the Bayes factor tends to be sensitive to the priors, including those on "nuisance"
parameters, we also calculate the ratios of the Schwarz criteria (Schwarz 1978) of the two
competing models. This commonly used as a "prior-free" approximation of the Bayes factor,
as it is essentially a ratio of the maximum likelihoods of the two models and does not depend
on the prior.14 In addition, the Schwarz criterion includes a penalty for the number of
estimated parameters, which should reduce the advantage of the FA model. We estimated
both models, FA and NoFA, by maximum likelihood and calculated the log ratio of the
Laplace approximations of the marginal likelihood assuming ￿ at priors on all parameters,
including standard deviation terms, as well as the ratio of the Schwarz criteria of the two
models.
14One drawback of the Schwarz criterion is that the di⁄erence between it and the true Bayes factor does
not go to zero as T gets large (see Kass and Raftery 1995 for a discussion).
19The log Bayes factor as measured by the Schwarz criterion is 22.4; the implied posterior
odds ratio of FA and NOFA is approximately 5.5 x 10^9 to 1 in favour of FA. The maximum
likelihood estimate of alpha was about 0.63, similar to the posterior mean estimate when
we use an informative prior. The log of the Laplace odds ratio was about 20.9, implying a
posterior odds ratio of 1.2*10^9 to 1 in favour of FA. The Laplace approximation and the
Schwarz approximation of the Bayes factor are within the same order of magnitude, and both
suggest that the data strongly favour the FA model over the NOFA model.15
4.2 Model Dynamics
4.2.1 How do model dynamics di⁄er with borrowing constraints?
We now compare the responses from the FA model presented against the estimated NOFA
model. The objective is to document the implications of the borrowing constraints for the
dynamics of our model. In Figure C2 we plot two lines summarizing the posterior distribution
of the model impulse responses for consumption from the NoFA model. The upper and lower
dashed lines represent the interval in which that model￿ s IRFs fall for 95 per cent of the draws
from the posterior distribution of parameters. Also plotted is the mean impulse response from
the FA model. A one percent rise in a variable is denoted as 0.01 on the y-axis and the number
of quarters elapsed since the shock are indicated on the x-axis.
The results show that for the housing demand, the housing investment and the monetary
policy shock the responses of consumption show important di⁄erences. Most striking is the
housing demand shock which generates a positive consumption response that can clearly not
be produced by the model without collateral e⁄ects. The FA model also generates a stronger
peak response of consumption to a monetary policy shock, as well as a more persistent one.
Monacelli (2009) shows similar e⁄ects resulting from the presence of collateral constraints.
It also ampli￿es the decline in consumption after a housing investment shock. For the other
shocks the FA model￿ s IRFs fall within the probability interval generated by the NoFA model.
For these shocks, including the neutral technology, country risk premium and export demand
shock, there is not a large di⁄erence between model dynamics if one takes into account
parameter uncertainty. These model responses show that the in￿ uence of the collateral
constraints on model dynamics will be more important for some shocks than others and can
15We did ￿nd that the estimates of some of our structural parameters were sensitive to the relaxation of
priors. In particular, the standard deviation of the monetary shock and the parameter governing the degree
of export price rigidity went to zero. For the maximum likelihood estimation we set those parameters equal
to zero a priori.
20even change the sign of some responses. It also indicates that the collateral constraints a⁄ect
the model most for shocks that are directly linked to the real price of housing.
The housing demand shock can be interpreted as a shock to the price of housing.16 In the
standard representative agent model, consumption falls in response to an housing demand
shock because households give up consumption today to purchase more housing. In the
model with collateralized debt, a rise in housing demand increases house prices and relaxes
the borrowing constraint, allowing impatient households to increase consumption closer to
desired levels.
To illustrate the importance of di⁄erent features of the model we plot impulse responses
(Figure C3) to a housing demand shock from the estimated model along with the responses
obtained when i) the borrowing households make up a very small fraction of the wage bill
(alpha=1); ii) wages are ￿ exible (calvow=0); and iii) access to the international bond market
is more costly (phi rises from 0.0006 to 0.1). We see that presence of borrowing constrained
households is crucial to obtain the positive response of consumption. In addition, the rise in
residential investment is initially more pronounced in the presence of constrained households.
The low estimated cost to access the foreign bond market is another factor that is important
for the consumption response. Reduced access to foreign savings (higher phi) increases the
response of the real interest rate and the yield spread17 to this shock as more savings must
come from internal sources. The higher internal demand is met by reducing the increase in
consumption and further expanding hours worked. Finally, the wage stickiness in our model
reduces the impact of the housing demand shock on marginal cost and in￿ ation. As a result
the interest rate rises less (relative to the calvow = 0 case) and there is a greater expansion
of hours worked supporting the boom.
4.3 Business Cycle Properties
In this section we compare the statistical properties of the model against those of the data.
Here we focus on the model characteristics at horizons that are most relevant for policy
makers, rather than on unconditional moments. To generate these moments in the data
we estimate a Bayesian Vector Autoregression (BVAR) model using the same data set.18
16Indeed, as we report below, the variance decompositions show that this is the shock responsible for the
largest part of house price ￿ uctuations in the model.
17Recall that the yield spread rises (above its steady state value) when the real interest rate rises above its
steady-state value.
18The variances from the BVAR were calculated from a BVAR with four lags estimated with a Normal-
Wishart prior (see Kadiyala and Karlsson (1997) for details), with prior variance hyperparameter (pi_1) set
21BVARs are a useful benchmark in this context because they are generally viewed to have
good forecasting properties and impose much weaker restrictions on the data than the DSGE
model.19 The statistics we consider are essentially the properties of the forecast errors of
each model at di⁄erent horizons up to two years.
Standard deviations. In Table 3 we report the standard deviations of key variables
in the data and from the models. These are conditional statistics that show the standard
deviation of the forecast of variable X at a 4-quarter horizon relative to the standard deviation
of GDP. We focus on the 4-quarter horizon as an illustration, but the results are broadly
similar for horizons up to 8-quarters.
Overall the standard deviations are quite similar for the model with collateral e⁄ects and
the model estimated with those e⁄ects constrained to zero (NoFA). There is an important
exception. The volatility of consumption in FA is 1.6 per cent and NoFA is 2.0 per cent
versus 1.2 per cent for the VAR. The collateral e⁄ects appear to improve the model￿ s ability
to match consumption volatility.
Table 3 shows the relative standard deviation of selected variables relative to the standard
deviation of GDP.20 The relative standard deviation of consumption in both models is close
to the data, though the consumption is somewhat less volatile in the model with the collateral
e⁄ects. Both models are able to generate a high degree of volatility in residential investment
and house prices, though still less than in the VAR. In addition, both models underpredict
the relative volatility of imports. The relative volatilities of in￿ ation, the real exchange rate
and the yield spread are all close to their values in the data.
Cross-correlations. Table 4 reports the cross-correlations for our key variables. These
statistics are the correlations in the forecast-errors of X and Y at a 4-quarter horizon, rather
than the in￿nite horizon correlation. The results are qualitatively similar at the 1-step and
8-step forecast horizons.
In the model, consumption and both types of investment are positively correlated with
GDP, as they are in the VAR. The model-implied correlations between GDP and consumption
are quite close to the correlation in the data and the correlation of ￿xed capital investment
at 0.012 and lags decaying at a rate 1/k^2, and 13 degrees of freedom (the minimum permissible) on the
Inverse Wishart prior on the error covariance matrix. Further, only draws from the posterior that resulted
in a stationary process (permitting a ￿nite unconditional variance) were used, further restricting the BVAR.
19In an early example, Schorfheide (2000) evaluates the ability of two DSGE models to match the correlation
between in￿ ation and output produced by a VAR.
20In general, the models generate considerably more volatility than the VAR.
22implied by the models is slightly stronger. Though the model with collateral e⁄ects gener-
ates a higher correlation between residential investment and GDP it is still well below the
correlation in the data.
Turning to cross correlations with real house prices, we see that the model with collat-
eral e⁄ects generates a correlation between consumption and real house prices that is very
close to the VAR. The collateral e⁄ects appear to be important for this ￿nding, since the
model without those e⁄ects generates only a very weak correlation. Both models produce a
correlation between house prices and residential investment that is close to that seen in the
VAR.
Overall, the model with collateral e⁄ects matches some key facts about consumption,
particularly its correlation with GDP and house prices. In addition, it produces a plausible
correlation between housing investment and house prices, despite a highly stylized hous-
ing production sector. Though the model is capturing the procyclical nature of residential
investment, the correlation is weak relative to the data.
Variance decomposition. Figures C4 - C9 show the decomposition of the forecast error
variance of output, in￿ ation, consumption, housing investment, house prices at the 1,4,8 and
in￿nite horizons.
House prices and residential investment are dominated by the housing market shocks.
At all horizons the variance of house prices is due primarily to the housing demand shock,
though the housing investment-speci￿c shock plays a role at longer horizons (Figure C5).
Residential investment ￿ uctuations are largely due to the housing investment-speci￿c shock
(about 60 per cent of the variance up to 8 quarter ahead), but housing demand shocks also
account for an important share, especially at longer horizons.
The housing demand shock also plays a role in the variance of consumption at horizons
up to 8 quarters (Figure C7), another sign of spillovers from the housing market. Not sur-
prisingly, the discount factor shock accounts for large fraction of the variance of consumption
at very short horizons. At longer horizons consumption ￿ uctuations are driven primarily by
aggregate productivity shocks and export demand. The importance of the export demand
shock is due, in part, to a long-lived rise in net foreign assets (wealth) that results from an
increased demand for domestic goods.
Finally, we consider what drives GDP and in￿ ation in our model. Figure C8 shows that
23housing market shocks account for roughly 5 per cent of the variance of GDP, making them
about as important as shocks to the country risk premium in this model. The housing
demand shocks alone account for about 2.5 per cent of the GDP variation at 8 quarters,
mirroring the post-1983 VAR evidence for Canada presented in IMF (2008). Studies of the
U.S. have also found relatively small impacts of housing demand shocks on aggregate output
(see Jarocinski and Smets (2008) and Iacoviello and Neri (2009)). Demand shocks in general
play a more important role at short horizons particularly the import demand and discount
factor shocks. At long horizons the neutral productivity shock accounts for the bulk of the
￿ uctuations in GDP. Figure C6 shows the variance decomposition for deviations of in￿ ation
around the target. Mark-up and productivity shocks and shocks to the country risk premium
(exchange rate) play an important role in the variance of in￿ ation deviations at all horizons.
It is worth comparing the importance of the shocks most a⁄ected by ￿nancial frictions
in the FA and NoFA models. In the FA model, housing demand shocks explain about 3.6
percent of the variation of GDP (given that output includes housing investment), and about 6
percent of consumption variation. In the NoFA model, by contrast, housing demand shocks
explain only 0.5 percent of GDP and 0.6 percent of consumption. The drivers of house
prices and residential investment in NoFA are almost identical to the results reported for FA:
housing demand accounts for about 83 per cent of short horizon variance of house prices and
housing demand and investment-e¢ ciency shocks account for over 90 per cent of the variance
of residential investment.
Much of the variance of consumption attributed to the housing demand shock under FA
is attributed to the discount factor shock in the model where collateral e⁄ects are constrained
to be zero. The discount factor shocks explain 50 percent of consumption variance at the
4-quarter horizon under NOFA, but only 30 percent under FA. The greater importance of the
housing demand shock in the FA model and lesser importance of the consumption preference
shock, suggests that the borrowing constraints are helping the model to capture some of the
comovement between consumption and house prices.
Historical decompositions. The statistics reported above help us to evaluate the
ability of each model to capture the full sample moments in the data. However, we are also
interested in how well the model can explain particular episodes in the Canadian business
cycle where ￿nancial frictions are likely to have been important.
To quantify the role played by collateral e⁄ects in our model we can compare consumption
over history from the model (actual consumption) against a counterfactual consumption path
24produced by turning o⁄ the collateral mechanism in the model (setting ￿ = 1) and using
the same historical shocks to generate a new Kalman smoothed estimate for consumption.
We interpret the di⁄erence in these two consumption paths as the impact of collateral e⁄ects
implied by our model. In ￿gure C10 we plot the contribution of these collateral e⁄ects to
the year-over-year growth rate of consumption. The ￿gure reveals a number of interesting
insights.
First, much of the growth in consumption in the early part of the housing boom of the
late 1980s is attributed to collateral e⁄ects. More speci￿cally, rising house prices played an
important role in consumption growth through the increase in value of housing collateral.
This positive e⁄ect peaked in late 1986 but continued to have a positive e⁄ect on consumption
growth until 1989.
Second, after 1989 the collateral e⁄ects begin to negatively a⁄ect consumption growth,
and have a pronounced impact on consumption in 1991. The sharp collateral e⁄ect on
consumption also occurs in 1982, suggesting that it an important role in accounting for
consumption dynamics in recessions. These collateral e⁄ects broadly re￿ ect developments in
the Canadian housing market at this time.
Finally, we consider the post-2000 period during which many OECD countries, including
Canada, have seen sharp increases in house prices and consumption. Our model suggests
that collateral e⁄ects contributed as much as 1.0 per cent to yearly consumption growth in
2000 and had a positive e⁄ect for most of the remainder of the sample. This contribution
is less than in the period from 1986 to 1990, but one simple reason is that the house price
increases since 2000 have been more gradual than in the late eighties when they rose to the
same level in 3 years rather than 6.
The collateral e⁄ects shown in Figure C10 are driven predominantly by the di⁄erential
response of the model to housing demand shocks. As discussed above, reducing the share of
borrowers in the model leads to a consumption decline rather than an increase. Explaining
the di⁄erences between the 1980s housing boom and recent one is thus partly due the fact
that the housing demand shocks were more important in the earlier period. However, since
consumption and house prices have reached the same peaks attained in 1989, why are housing
demand shocks less important? We ￿nd that this is related to di⁄erences in the residential
construction and external factors.
Unlike the real house price, the level of residential construction does not continue to
25rise after 2005 (though well above trend). To explain this fact the model uses a decline in
the housing-investment e¢ ciency shock. One interpretation is that residential investment
becomes more costly and the housing stock more di¢ cult to adjust. In the housing sector
this might be the result of bottlenecks in production, including the di¢ culty in ￿nding and
keeping skilled trades and reduced availability of serviced land. As a result, prices continue
to rise but housing construction does not.
Our model also highlights external developments as a major di⁄erence between the late
1980s and the period after 2000. A decomposition of consumption over this period shows a
rising contribution from the country-risk premium. This shock is very important for capturing
the pronounced rise in the real exchange rate vis-a-vis the United States. A key factor driving
the exchange rate movement in the data is a large improvement in Canada￿ s terms of trade.
The result in the model is a sharply increasing net foreign asset position. The long-lived
e⁄ects on wealth lead households to consume more and work less. One key distinction
between a positive housing demand and a negative risk premium shock is that the latter
implies a reduction in hours worked. Together these two shocks are able to generate rising
consumption and house prices and relatively little movement in hours worked consistent with
the data from 2005 onward.
5. Conclusion
We estimate an open-economy DSGE model with residential investment and household bor-
rowing constraints for Canada. In this model housing plays a key role as collateral and house
prices add a new channel of transmission to consumption from aggregate shocks. Our goal
is to better understand the links between the housing market and aggregate consumption
in Canada. In particular we assess the empirical support for housing collateral e⁄ects on
consumption.
We compare two estimated versions of the model, one with the ￿nancial accelerator e⁄ects
and one where these e⁄ects are removed. We ￿nd that the FA model has a better ￿t to
the data as measured by Bayes Factor comparisons. In addition, we obtain a parameter
estimate associated with the share of constrained households that is empirically plausible.
The FA model￿ s main empirical advantage is in explaining the dynamics of consumption and
its correlation with house prices. Overall the main impact of collateral constraints on the
dynamics of our model come from the model response to a housing demand shock￿ a shock
that has been emphasized in Jarocinski and Smets (2008) and in IMF (2008).
26The model with credit frictions is able to generate rising consumption in response to a
shock to housing demand. A positive housing demand shock increases the price of housing
and the value of collateral, improving the borrowing capacity of credit constrained agents.
As a result, our estimated model generates an increase in aggregate consumption after a rise
in housing prices. The model attributes an important role to housing demand shocks for
the consumption boom in the late 1980s and the drop in consumption that occurred in the
recessions of the 1980s and 1990s. We ￿nd that this shock has been important in the recent
housing boom, but, relative to the 1980s, external factors have played a larger role in housing
market and consumption developments.
One result that merits further investigation is that the estimated collateral e⁄ects on
consumption growth were smaller in the post-2000 period than in the late 1980s. This appears
to be at odds with the fact that home-equity secured borrowing was much higher in the latter
period. Home equity borrowing was less than 10 per cent of consumer credit in the late 1980s
and is currently over 50 per cent. Extending the dataset to use information on credit ￿ ows
could help to more directly identify these collateral e⁄ects. However, using ￿nancial ￿ ows
information brings other challenges, in particular reconciling the di⁄erences between the
￿nancial instruments and the people who use them in the data with the environment in our
model.
27References
Adolfson, M., S. Laseen, J. Linde, and M. Villani. 2007. ￿Bayesian Estimation of an open
economy DSGE model with incomplete pass-through.￿Journal of International Economics
72: 481￿ 511.
Aizenman, J. and Y. Jinjarak. 2008. ￿Current Account Patterns and National Real Estate
Markets.￿ National Bureau of Economic Researh, Working Paper 13921.
Amirault, D., C. Kwan, and G. Wilkinson. 2006. ￿Survey of Price-Setting Behaviour of
Canadian Companies.￿ Working paper 2006-35 Bank of Canada.
Aoki, K., J. Proudman, and G. Vlieghe. 2004. ￿House Prices, Consumption, and Monetary
Policy: A Financial Accelerator Approach.￿ Journal of Financial Intermediation (13):
414￿ 435.
Armour, J., W. Engert, and B. Fung. 1996. ￿Overnight Rate Innovations as a Measure
of Monetary Policy Shocks in Vector Autoregressions.￿ Bank of Canada Working Paper
1996-4.
Attanasio, O., L. Blow, R. Hamilton, and A. Leicester. 2005. ￿Booms and Busts: Con-
sumption, house prices and expectations.￿ Institute for Fiscal Studies, Working Paper
WP05/24.
Benito, A. and H. Mumtaz. 2006. ￿Consumption excess Sensitivity, Liquidity Constraints
and the Collateral Role of Housing.￿ Bank of England, Working Paper no. 306.
Campbell, J. and J. Cocco. 2007. ￿How do house prices a⁄ect consumption? Evidence from
micro data.￿ Journal of Monetary Economics 54: 591￿ 621.
Campbell, J. and G. Mankiw. 1991. ￿The Response of Consumption to Income: A Cross-
Country Investigation.￿ European Economic Review 34(4): 723￿ 56.
Carroll, C. and A. Samwick. 1997. ￿The Nature of Precautionary Wealth.￿ Journal of
Monetary Economics 40(1): 41￿ 72.
Case, K., J. Quigley, and R. Shiller. 2005. ￿Comparing Wealth E⁄ects: The Stock Market
versus the Housing Market.￿ Advances in Macroeconomics 5: 1￿ 32.
Christiano, L., M. Eichenbaum, and C. Evans. 2005. ￿Nominal rigidities and the Dynamic
E⁄ects of a Shock to Monetary Policy.￿ Journal of Political Economy 113: 1￿ 45.
28Christo⁄el, K., G. Coenen, and A. Warne. 2007. ￿Conditional Versus Unconditional Fore-
casting With the New Area Wide Model of the Euro Area.￿ Preliminary Draft European
Central Bank.
Cote, D., J. Kuszczak, J.P. Lam, Y. Liu, and P. St-Amant. 2004. ￿The performance of
robustness of simple monetary rules in models of the Canadian economy.￿ Canadian
Journal of Economics 37: 978￿ 998.
Davis, M. and J. Heathcote. 2005. ￿Housing and the Business Cycle.￿International Economic
Review 46(3): 751￿ 784.
DeGraeve, F., M. Emiris, and R. Wouters. 2007. ￿A Structural Decomposition of the US
Yield Curve.￿ Manuscript, Central Bank of Belgium.
Dib, A. 2003. ￿Monetary Policy in Estimated Models of Small Open and Closed Economies.￿
Bank of Canada, Discussion Paper 2003-27.
￿ ￿ ￿ . 2008. ￿Welfare E⁄ects of Commodity Price and Exchange Rate Volatilities in a
Multi-Sector Small Open Economy Model.￿ Bank of Canada, Discussion Paper 2008-8.
Dib, A., C. Mendicino, and Y. Zhang. 2008. ￿Price Level Targeting in a Small Open Economy
with Financial Frictions: Welfare Analysis.￿ Working paper 2008-40 Bank of Canada.
Erceg, C., D. Henderson, and A. Levin. 2000. ￿Optimal monetary policy with staggered wage
and price contracts.￿ Journal of Monetary Economics 46(2): 281￿ 313.
Fisher, J.D.M. 2006. ￿The Dynamic E⁄ects of Neutral and Investment-Speci￿c Technology.￿
Journal of Political Economy 114(3): 413￿ 451.
Fung, B. and M. Yuan. 1999. ￿Measuring the Stance of Monetary Policy.￿Money, Monetary
Policy and Transmission Mechanisms: Bank of Canada Conference Volume.
Greenwood, J., Z. Hercowitz, and P. Krusell. 1998. ￿The Role of Investment-Speci￿c Tech-
nological Change in the Business Cycle.￿ European Economic Review 44: 91￿ 115.
Iacoviello, M. 2005. ￿House prices, borrowing constraints and monetary policy in the business
cycle.￿ American Economic Review 95(3): 739￿ 764.
Iacoviello, M. and S. Neri. 2008. ￿The Role of Housing Collateral in an Estimated Two-Sector
Model of the US Economy.￿ Photocopy, Boston College.
￿ ￿ ￿ . 2009. ￿Housing Market Spillovers: Evidence from an Estimated DSGE Model.￿
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics Forthcoming.
29IMF. 2008. ￿The changing housing cycle and the implications for monetary policy.￿Chapter
3 of World Economic Outlook. International Monetary Fund.
Jappelli, T. 1990. ￿Who is Credit Constrained in the US Economy?￿ Quarterly Journal of
Economics 94: 219￿ 234.
Jarocinski, M. and F. Smets. 2008. ￿House Prices and the Stance of Monetary Policy.￿
European Central Bank Working Paper Number 891.
Kadiyala, K. and S. Karlsson. 1997. ￿Numerical methods for estimation and inference in
Bayesian VAR-models.￿ Journal of Applied Econometrics 12: 99￿ 132.
Kiyotaki, N. and J. Moore. 1997. ￿Credit Cycles.￿ The Journal of Political Economy 105:
211￿ 248.
Kostenbauer, K. 2001. ￿Housing Depreciation in the Canadian CPI.￿ Statistics Canada
Publication 62F0014MIE(15).
Lam, J.P. and G. Tkacz. 2004. ￿Estimating Policy-Neutral Interest Rates for Canada Using a
Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Framework.￿Journal of Economics and Statistics
140(1): 89￿ 126.
Lawrence, E. 1991. ￿Poverty and the rate of Time Preference: Evidence from Panel Data.￿
Journal of Political Economy 99(1): 54￿ 77.
Monacelli, T. 2009. ￿New Keynesian models, durable goods, and collateral constraints.￿
Journal of Monetary Economics 56: 242￿ 254.
Ortega, E. and N. Rebei. 2006. ￿the welfare implications of in￿ atian versus price level
targeting in a small two-sector, small open economy.￿ Working paper 2003-12 Bank of
Canada.
Pichette, L. and D. Tremblay. 2003. ￿Are Wealth E⁄ects Important For Canada.￿ Bank of
Canada working Paper No. 2003-9.
Samwick, A. 1998. ￿Discount Rate Heterogeneity and Social Security Reform.￿ Journal of
Development Economics 57(1): 117￿ 146.
Schmitt-Grohe, S. and M. Uribe. 2003. ￿Closing Small Open Economy Models.￿ Journal of
International Economics 61: 163￿ 85.
Schorfheide, F. 2000. ￿Loss-function-based evaluation of DSGE models.￿Journal of Applied
Econometrics 15: 647￿ 670.
30Smets, F. and R. Wouters. 2003. ￿An Estimated Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium
Model of the Euro Area.￿ European Economic Review 1: 1123￿ 1175.
￿ ￿ ￿ . 2007. ￿Shocks and Frictions in US Business Cycles: A Bayesian DSGE Approach.￿
American Economic Review 97: 586￿ 606.
31Appendix A: Data sources
GDP Statistics Canada, National Income and Expenditure Accounts, Series v1992067 Real Gross
Domestic Product, Expenditure-based - Canada; Millions Chained 1997 dollars; Seasonally adjusted
at annual rates; Gross Domestic Product at market prices
Consumption Statistics Canada, National Income and Expenditure Accounts, Series
v1992044 Real Gross Domestic Product, Expenditure-based - Canada; Millions Chained 1997 dol-
lars; Seasonally adjusted at annual rates; Personal expenditure on consumer goods and services
Residential structures investment Statistics Canada, National Income and Expenditure
Accounts, Series v1992053 Real Gross Domestic Product, Expenditure-based - Canada; Millions
Chained 1997 dollars; Seasonally adjusted at annual rates; Residential structures
Business Fixed Investment Statistics Canada, National Income and Expenditure Ac-
counts, Series v1992054 Real Gross Domestic Product, Expenditure-based - Canada; Millions
Chained 1997 dollars; Seasonally adjusted at annual rates; Non-residential structures and equipment
Exports Statistics Canada, National Income and Expenditure Accounts, Series v1992060 Real
Gross Domestic Product, Expenditure-based - Canada; Millions Chained 1997 dollars; Seasonally
adjusted at annual rates; Exports of goods and services
Imports Statistics Canada, National Income and Expenditure Accounts, Series v1992063 Real
Gross Domestic Product, Expenditure-based - Canada; Millions Chained 1997 dollars; Seasonally
adjusted at annual rates; Imports of goods and services
Housing Stock Annual; Millions; Nominal; Book value:V33464 National balance sheet ac-
counts by sectors - Canada; Persons and unincorporated business; Residential structures. V33469
National balance sheet accounts by sectors - Canada; Persons and unincorporated business; Land
House prices MLS102003 National Quarterly res. average price actual; seasonally adjusted
(Monthly) and de￿ ated data by core in￿ ation.
In￿ ation Quarter to quarter change of PCPIX. CPIX Consumer price index (CPI) seasonally
adjusted 2001 basket content - Canada; Core consumer price index (CPI); monthly
Interest rates BR.CDN Bank Rate (as at Wednesday);v122501 Government of Canada Bond
yield averages - 10 yrs & over (average of the Wednesday values) ; monthly
32Real Exchange Rate Nominal bilateral exchange rate multiplied by US CPI divided by Cdn
CPIX with 2002 as base year
V37426 nominal bilateral exchange rate; Level of Canadian Dollar per US Dollar recorded at
noon; Based on information obtained from the Foreign Interbank Market; Average of daily data
m.cusa0l1e US CPI; All items less food and energy - index base 1982-84 = 1.0; Seasonally
adjusted - all urban consumers
Hours Worked v4391505 Labour force survey estimates (LFS) actual hours worked by North
American Industry Classi￿cation System (NAICS) seasonally adjusted - Canada; Total actual hours
worked all industries; monthly
Labour Compensation v498166 Sector accounts persons and unincorporated businesses -
Canada; Wages salaries and supplementary labour income; Seasonally adjusted at annual rates;
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Table 1: FA Parameters
Parameter Prior Distribution Posterior Distribution
Type Mean St. Dev. Mean 5% 95%
Habit formation ￿ beta 0.5 0.25 0.7832 0.7267 0.8413
Slope of Labour Supply ￿ gamma 2 1 0.5487 0.2823 0.7928
Adj. Cost for Housing  h gamma 1 0.5 1.1723 0.8659 1.4425
Adj. Cost for capital  k gamma 1 0.5 1.6102 0.9607 2.2711
Price Stickiness Domestic ￿d beta 0.5 0.1 0.8396 0.7970 0.8808
Price Stickiness Imports ￿m beta 0.5 0.1 0.8085 0.7580 0.8634
Price Stickiness Exports ￿x beta 0.5 0.1 0.2067 0.1123 0.2934
Price Stickiness Wages ￿w beta 0.5 0.25 0.3334 0.2817 0.3898
Elast. of Country Risk Prem. ￿ inv. gamma 0.001 Inf 0.0006 0.0003 0.0009
UIP Lag ￿s beta 0.25 0.15 0.1016 0.0190 0.1752
Share of Patient Households ￿ beta 0.65 0.075 0.6234 0.5606 0.6831
Import Demand ￿ gamma 1 0.5 0.3455 0.1900 0.5041
Export Demand ￿f gamma 1 0.5 1.6418 1.1193 2.1309
Monetary Policy Rule
Int. Rate Smoothing ￿r beta 0.5 0.25 0.5279 0.4005 0.6600
Response to In￿ ation ￿￿1
￿ beta 0.5 0.25 0.5939 0.4787 0.7132
Response to Output ￿y gamma 0.125 0.0625 0.0327 0.0103 0.0546
34Auto-Regressive Coe¢ cients of Shocks
Housing Demand ￿j beta 0.5 0.25 0.9758 0.9590 0.9943
Housing Supply ￿Ah beta 0.5 0.25 0.9348 0.8989 0.9709
Capital Supply ￿Ak beta 0.5 0.25 0.5021 0.3400 0.6692
Price Mark-Up ￿p beta 0.5 0.25 0.7573 0.6292 0.8870
Labour Supply ￿L beta 0.5 0.25 0.2418 0.0941 0.3791
Technology ￿z beta 0.5 0.25 0.9850 0.9724 0.9967
Import Demand ￿m beta 0.5 0.25 0.9039 0.8653 0.9433
Export Demand ￿x beta 0.5 0.25 0.9850 0.9696 0.9968
Exchange Rate ￿s beta 0.5 0.25 0.9420 0.9120 0.9780
Discount Factor ￿b beta 0.5 0.25 0.2247 0.0304 0.4044
In￿ ation Objective ￿IO beta 0.5 0.25 0.9939 0.9890 0.9995
Standard Deviations of Shocks
Housing Demand ￿j inv. gamma 0.300 Inf 0.2986 0.2523 0.3404
Housing Supply ￿Ah inv. gamma 0.030 Inf 0.0334 0.0295 0.0372
Capital Supply ￿Ak inv. gamma 0.020 Inf 0.0180 0.0146 0.0212
Price Mark-Up ￿w inv. gamma 0.020 Inf 0.0228 0.0129 0.0323
Labour Supply ￿L inv. gamma 0.070 Inf 0.0817 0.0522 0.1105
Technology ￿z inv. gamma 0.010 Inf 0.0119 0.0105 0.0132
Monetary Policy ￿MP inv. gamma 0.003 Inf 0.0010 0.0007 0.0013
Import Demand ￿M inv. gamma 0.020 Inf 0.0219 0.0194 0.0243
Export Demand ￿X inv. gamma 0.025 Inf 0.0357 0.0265 0.0446
Exchange Rate ￿s inv. gamma 0.025 Inf 0.0197 0.0119 0.0268
Discount Factor ￿b inv. gamma 0.030 Inf 0.0291 0.0218 0.0365
In￿ ation Objective ￿IO inv. gamma 0.001 Inf 0.0020 0.0015 0.0024
35Table 2: NOFA Parameters
Parameter Prior Distribution Posterior Distribution
Type Mean St. Dev. Mean 5% 95%
Habit formation ￿ beta 0.5 0.25 0.6466 0.5442 0.7426
Slope of Labour Supply ￿ gamma 2 1 0.6172 0.2996 0.9294
Adj. Cost for Housing  h gamma 1 0.5 1.1403 0.8489 1.4283
Adj. Cost for capital  k gamma 1 0.5 1.8293 1.1347 2.5245
Price Stickiness Domestic ￿d beta 0.5 0.1 0.8485 0.8079 0.8843
Price Stickiness Imports ￿m beta 0.5 0.1 0.8178 0.7628 0.8702
Price Stickiness Exports ￿x beta 0.5 0.1 0.2389 0.1147 0.3504
Price Stickiness Wages ￿w beta 0.5 0.25 0.3047 0.2503 0.3554
Elast. of Country Risk Prem. ￿ inv. gamma 0.001 Inf 0.0005 0.0002 0.0007
UIP Lag ￿s beta 0.25 0.15 0.0973 0.0155 0.1696
Import Demand ￿ gamma 1 0.5 0.3669 0.1941 0.5343
Export Demand ￿f gamma 1 0.5 1.3968 0.8871 1.8531
Monetary Policy Rule
Int. Rate Smoothing ￿r beta 0.5 0.25 0.4589 0.3321 0.5941
Response to In￿ ation ￿￿ gamma 1.65 0.25 0.6144 0.5039 0.7271
Response to Output ￿y gamma 0.125 0.0625 0.0277 0.0071 0.0465
36Auto-Regressive Coe¢ cients of Shocks
Housing Demand ￿j beta 0.5 0.25 0.9622 0.9389 0.9886
Housing Supply ￿Ah beta 0.5 0.25 0.9391 0.9004 0.9786
Capital Supply ￿Ak beta 0.5 0.25 0.4497 0.2669 0.6373
Price Mark-Up ￿w beta 0.5 0.25 0.7665 0.6377 0.8859
Labour Supply ￿L beta 0.5 0.25 0.3212 0.1750 0.4662
Technology ￿z beta 0.5 0.25 0.9778 0.9628 0.9933
Import Demand ￿m beta 0.5 0.25 0.9259 0.8923 0.9599
Export Demand ￿x beta 0.5 0.25 0.9763 0.9628 0.9945
Exchange Rate ￿s beta 0.5 0.25 0.9700 0.9495 0.9902
Discount Factor ￿b beta 0.5 0.25 0.6595 0.5470 0.7772
In￿ ation Objective ￿IO beta 0.5 0.25 0.9910 0.9844 0.9987
Standard Deviations of Shocks
Housing Demand ￿j inv. gamma 0.300 Inf 0.3266 0.2801 0.3703
Housing Supply ￿Ah inv. gamma 0.030 Inf 0.0335 0.0298 0.0373
Capital Supply ￿Ak inv. gamma 0.020 Inf 0.0175 0.0136 0.0211
Price Mark-Up ￿w inv. gamma 0.020 Inf 0.0208 0.0121 0.0298
Labour Supply ￿L inv. gamma 0.070 Inf 0.0690 0.0447 0.0927
Technology ￿z inv. gamma 0.010 Inf 0.0120 0.0107 0.0134
Monetary Policy ￿MP inv. gamma 0.003 Inf 0.0009 0.0007 0.0012
Import Demand ￿m inv. gamma 0.020 Inf 0.0220 0.0196 0.0244
Export Demand ￿x inv. gamma 0.025 Inf 0.0318 0.0236 0.0396
Exchange Rate ￿s inv. gamma 0.025 Inf 0.0283 0.0163 0.0404
Discount Factor ￿b inv. gamma 0.030 Inf 0.0223 0.0164 0.0278
In￿ ation Objective ￿IO inv. gamma 0.001 Inf 0.0022 0.0017 0.0027
37Table 3: Four-Step Ahead Standard Deviations
Standard Deviations
(Relative to the S.D. of GDP)
VAR Model FA Model NOFA Model
C 0.8227 0.7664 0.9346
L 0.8085 0.8645 0.8691
w 0.8936 0.7991 0.7804
Ik 3.2270 3.4813 3.4533
Ih 4.6170 3.2290 3.2850
qh 2.8936 2.3224 2.3458
￿ 0.2128 0.2477 0.2523
Y x 2.4752 2.3785 2.3551
Y m 2.6241 2.0234 1.8738
s 2.8298 2.5093 2.4252
yield spr. 0.1348 0.1589 0.1542
Table 4: Four-Step-Ahead Correlations
Correlations
VAR Model FA Model NOFA Model
Correlation with GDP
C 0.6718 0.6433 0.5980
L 0.4522 0.3188 0.3648
Ik 0.4077 0.5438 0.5078
Ih 0.7148 0.2835 0.2071
￿ -0.1128 -0.1359 -0.1395
Correlation with House Prices
C 0.4748 0.4617 0.1157
Ik 0.2307 0.1098 0.2157
Ih 0.5666 0.4757 0.4883
38Appendix C: Figures
Figure C1: Detrended Data Series Used in Estimation
39Figure C2: Mean responses of consumption to various shocks under the FA model (solid),
vs. the 95% con￿dence bands under the NoFA model (dashed)
40Figure C3: Impulse Responses to a Housing Demand Shock
41Figure C4: Decomposition of Housing Investment Variance (FA Model)
Figure C5: Decomposition of House Price Variance (FA Model)
42Figure C6: Decomposition of Variance of In￿ ation Deviation from Target (FA Model)
Figure C7: Decomposition of Consumption Variance (FA Model)
43Figure C8: Decomposition of GDP Variance (FA Model)
Figure C9: Decomposition of Yield Spread Variance (FA Model)
44Figure C10: Contribution of Collateral E⁄ects to Consumption
45